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1. Introductory Remarks-H.よMackinderand Russo・German
Relations 
As early as January 1904， just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese 
War， Sir Halford John Mackinder gave a speech at the Royal Geographical So・
ciety in London entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History." ln this speech， 
Mackinder asked the audience “for a moment to look upon Europe and Euro-
pean history as subordinate to Asia and Asiatic history， for European civiliza-
tion is， ina very rea1 sense， the outcome of the secular struggle against Asiatic 
invasion. "(1) 
Mackinder studied at Christ Church， Oxford， and was appointed to the 
newly created Readership in Geography of the University of Oxford in 1887. 
ln 1903 he was appointed Director of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science where he taught Economic Geography until 1925.(2) 
According to Mackinder， the steppe lands， which he considered the “heart-
land" of Euro-Asia， were a pivotal factor in the history of the Old World. The 
invasion of Attila and Ghenghizkhan and the establishment of the Mongolian 
Empires of Kipchakkhan and Ilkhan were some of the most salient examples. 
The making of modern Russia was a process of recovering the land from these 
Mongolians. At the same time Russia began to conquer the steppe lands 
behind the Ural mountains. Mackinder says: 
“. • .While the maritime peoples of Western Europe have covered the 
ocean with their flets， set1ed the outer continents， and in varying degree 
made tributary the oceanic margins of Asia， Russia has organized the 
Cossacks， and， emerging from her northern forests， has policed the steppe 
by setting her own nomads to meet the Tartar nomads. The Tudor century， 
which saw the expansion of Western Europe over the sea， also saw Russian 
power carried from Moscow through Siberia. The eastward swoop of the 
horsemen across Asia was an event almost as pregnant with political conse-
quences as was the rounding of the Cape， although the two movements 
long remained apart.川3)
Turning his eyes to the contemporary situation which he was faced with， 
Mackinder discussed as follows: 
“Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Her pressure on Finland， on Scan-
dinavia， on Poland， on Turkey， on Persia， on India， and on China replaces 
the centrifugal raids of the steppemen. In the world at large she occupies 
the central strategical position held by Germany in Europe. She can strike 
on al sides and be struck from al sides， save the north. The ful develop-
ment of her modern railway mobility is merely a matter of time. Nor is it 
likely that any possible social revolution wil alter her essential relations to 
the great geographicallimits of her existence. Wisely recognizing the fun-
damentallimits of her power， her rulers have parted with Alaskaj for it is 
as much a law of policy for Russia to own nothing over seas as for Britain 
to be supreme on the ocean. 
Outside the pivot area， ina great inner crescent， are Germany， Austria， 
Turkey， India， and China， and in an outer crescent， Britain， South Africa， 
Australia， the United States， Canada， and Japan. In the present condition 
of the balance of power， the pivot state， Russia， isnot equivalent to the 
peripheral states， and there is room for an equipoise in France. The United 
States has recently become an eastern power， affecting the European 
balance not direct1y， but through Russia， and she wil construct the 
Panama canal to make her Mississippi and Atlantic resources available in 
the Pacific. From this point of view the real divide between east and west is 
to be found in the Atlantic ocean. 
The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state， 
resulting in its expansion over the marginallands of Euro司Asia，would per-
mit of the use of vast continental resources for fl.eet-building， and the em-
pire of the world would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany 
were to aly herself with Russia. The threat of such an event should， 
therefore， throw France into alliance with the over-sea powers， and 
France， Italy， Egypt， India， and Korea would become so many bridge 
heads where the outside navies would support armies to compel the pivot 
叫liesto deploy land forces and prevent them from concentrating their 
whole strength on fl.ets. On a smaIler scale that w酪 whatWellington ac-
complished from his sea-base at Torres Vedras in the Peninsular War. May 
not this in the end prove to be the strategical function of India in the 
British Imperial system? Is not this the idea underlying Mr. Amery's con-
ception that the British military front stretches from the Cape through In-
dia to Japan?"(4) 
In this lecture the geographer Mackinder pointed out the importance of the 
so-called “heart land"， which was occupied by the Tsarist Russia in his days. 
At the same time he saw a great menace for the world at large in the military 
alliance of Russia and Germany， aheavily armed country which occupies a cen-
tral strategic position in Europe.(S) 
In this article， 1 would like to focus my attention on the development of 
Russo・Germanrelations from the unification of Germany up to the Chen-pao-
tao Incident in 1969. ln considering these relations 1 would like to stress the im-
portance of East-Asia. It goes without saying that Germany lies between the 
Western powers and Russia， and that Russia neighbours East幽Asia，especially 
China and Japan on her eastern border. Mackinder's lecture is excellent 
especially because he pays for his days an exceptionally great attention to the 
historical meaning of the “heart land" to the destiny of Europe in general. 
However， his view on the eastern front of the “heart land" is somewhat 
obscure and confused.<S) The fact that Russia has two fronts， eastern and 
-2-
western， has not been noticed enough， not only by Mackinder， but also by the 
European historians in general. My intention here is to combine these two 
aspects taking a bird's-eye view of the one century since the emergence of Ger-
many as a unified power. 
I. Russo・GermanRelations and East Asia before World War 1 
Before World War 1， it was unthinkable that cordial or at least friendly rela-
tions could be established between France and Germany. This was so ever 
since Germany's seizure of Alsace-Lorraine from France as the spoils of the 
Franco-Prussian War 1870-71. The diplomatic course of what was later called 
West orientation was thus c10sed to Germany. In order to isolate France， the 
German Chancel1or， Otto von Bismarck， endeavoured with scrupulous care to 
build up an international security system in which al the major European 
powers except France were either Germany's allies， like Austria-Hungary and 
Italy， orfriends like England and Russia. The Achi1es' heel in this system lay 
in the Russo・Germanrelations. Three years before his demission， Bismarck 
succeeded in securing Russian friendship for Germany by the Re-insurance 
Treaty signed in June 1887. Bismarck kept this treaty absolutely secret and did 
not give notice of its secret c1auses concerning Bulgaria and the Straights even 
to Germany's c10sest ally Austria-Hungary. These c1auses were incompatible 
with Austria-Hungary's ambition toward the Balkan peninsula. Unfortunately 
for Germany， the negotiations to renew this Re-insurance Treaty coincided 
with Bismarck's fal1 in March 1890. The successors of Bismarck's foreign 
policy in Germany believed that Germany should cease such walk on a 
tightrope between Russia and Austria-Hungary， but they did not believe that 
the rejection of the Russian offer of renewal of the treaty would resu1t in the 
making of a military alliance between Russia and France. These successors of 
Bismarck were not able to foresee that the difference of political systems of 
these two countries， republican and monarchical， was no hindrance to 
alliance. The visit of a French naval squadron to the Russian port of 
Kronstadt， which received an ecstatic reception by the Russians， was the first 
step in the Franco-Russian rapprochement.(6) 
The unification of Germany in 1871 brought about a totally new interna-
tional situation in Europe. The neighbouring powers were forced to adapt 
themselves to this new situation caused by the sudden emergence of a powerful 
state in the centre of Europe. As David Calleo has put it，“a united Germany is 
often said to have been too big and dynamic for any stable European system. 
Inevitably， such a Germany threatened the political independence and 
economic well-being of its neighbors. "(7) The same w 
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Economics and Political Science， gives us a compact description of the Russian 
attitude toward this new situation after the German unification. He says as 
follows: 
“In the period 1871-1905 the most significant move in Russian foreign 
policy was the cementing of the Franco-Russian alliance by the agreements 
and ceremonial visits which occurred between 1891 and 1894. The alliance 
was in many ways a logical consequence of the war of 1870-1. The sudden 
establishment in the centre of Europe of a unified and militarily formidable 
German Empire was bound to arouse fears in Russia. In the last five years 
Germany had after al attacked and in a matter of weeks routed the armies 
of the other two truly Great Powers on the European continent. Whatever 
the warm relations between Russia and Germany's rulers in 1871， per-
sonalities and political sympathies changed whereas overwhelming German 
power not just remained but grew ever more formidable. It is therefore not 
surprising that many Russians desired France's restoration to Great Power 
status so that she might， ifneed be， act as a diplomatic or even military 
counterweight to Germany.'明}
Lieven says that the Franco-Russian alliance came in the course of the 
Russo-Japanese War 1904-05 under heavy strain. Britain was an ally of Japan 
from 1902 on and her attitude before and during the war was een by the Rus-
sians as having incited J apan to war(9) and as providing J apan with the means 
to fight and as having acted during the war in a hostile manner. According to 
Lieven， France， Russia's ally，“was in 1903-4 growing ever closer to Britain， 
moving from an amicable solution of colonial squabbles towards a general u任
derstanding with London on European and world affairs."(IO) Thus Russia felt 
isolated in spite of the Franco-Russian alliance and confronted with the an-
tagonistic policy of Britain. 
On the other hand， Germany was feeling the impact of international en・
circlement which became more concrete by the establishment of the Entente 
Cordiale between France and Britain in April 1904. It is very interesting for us 
Japanese historians to investigate how the German effort to break up this inter-
national encirclement by utilizing what Lieven calls a “potential split in the 
Franco-Russian alliance"(11) affected the situation in East Asia bordering the 
eastern frontier of the Tzarist Russia. 
Of much importance in this respect is the signing of the Secret Treaty of 
Bjorko between the German Emperor William the Second and the Russian 
Emperor Nicholas the Second on the yacht of the Russian Emperor “Polar 
Star" anchoring near the Bjorko Island in the Viborg Bay in Finland.(12) The 
signing took place on July 24， 1905. The Baltic Fleet of Russia under the com-
mand of Admiral Zinovii Rozdestvensky was annihilated two months previous-
ly by the J apanese Fleet under the command of Admiral Heihachiro Togo in 
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the sea battle of Tsushima on May 27 and 28， 1905. The First Russian Revolu-
tion had been raging at home. The Dogger Bank Incident in October of the 
preceding year brought Britain and Russia close to war{l3) and demonstrated to 
the Russians how antagonistic the British were to them. The German Kaiser in-
tended fully to utilize this situation. He promised to offer Russia a state of 
“detente"， to use a modern expression， between Germany and Russia， at a 
time when Russia was being much annoyed by her eastern neighbour， the 
J apanese Empire. With enthusiasm wrote the Kaiser to the Oerman Chancellor 
Bernhard von Bulow on July 25 about his conversations with the Russian' Tsar 
on board of “Polar Star". The Kaiser visited the “Polar Star" with a draft of 
the hoped-for treaty in his pocket. The conversation was carried on in the 
English language and it turned on the subject of England's intrigues against 
Russia in connection with the war with Japan. The Kaiser wrote: 
“1 soon observed how deeply injured the Tsar felt by the attitude of France 
in the Dogger Bank Affair， and how， atEngland's behest， Rodjestv阻止i
had been chased out of Cochin-China， virtualIy into the hands of the Japs: 
‘The French behaved like scoundrels to me; by order of England， my AlIy 
left me in the lurch; and now look at Brestl How they fraternize with the 
English. . . What shall 1 do in this disagreeable situation'!' 
Now 1 fe1t the moment was come!..'How would it be， ifwe， too， 
should make a “litle agreement'!" Last winter we talked about it. . .'‘O 
yes， tobe sure， 1 remember well， but 1 forgot the contents of it. What a pity 
1 haven't got it here.'‘1 have a copy， which 1 happen to have quite by 
chance in my pocket.' "(1の
The Tsar read the text and said，“That is quite excellent， I quite agree!" .(15) 
The Kaiser reported further: 
“My heart beats so loudly that 1 can hear it; 1 pull myself together即 d
say， casually，‘Should you like to sign it? It would be a very nice souvenir 
of our interview.' He scanned the paper again， and then he said: 'Yes， 1 
wil.' 1 opened the ink-well and gave him the pen， and he wrote with a firm 
hand ‘Nicholas，' then he handed the pen to me and 1 signed. When 1 arose 
he grasped me into his arms deeply moved and said:‘1 thank God and 1 
thank you; it wil be of the most beneficial consequences for my country 
and yours; you are Russia's only real friend in the whole world， 1 have felt 
that through the whole war and 1 know it.' "(16) 
And the Kaiser wrote at the ze凶thof his enthusiaSm: 
“Thus has the morning of July 24， 1905 at Bjorko become a turning point 
in the history of Europe， thanks to the grace of God; and a great reIief in 
the situation for my dear Fatherland which at last wil be freed from the 
frightful Franco-Russian pincers. (17) 
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At this moment， what Mackinder feared in his lecture seemed to be realized 
one and a half years after that lecture was given in London. However， unfor-
tunately for the hopes of the Kaiser， the Russian Prime Minister Sergei Witte 
succeeded together with Lambsdorff， the Foreign Minister， and the Grand 
Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich“in persuading Nicholas I both that the new trea-
ty was incompatible with the French alliance and that Russian interests demand-
ed that the latter be preserved. "(18) 
The terms of the agreement were: 
(i) In the event of one of the Empires being attacked by a European 
Power， the other wil asist it in Europe with al the navaI and 
miItary forces at its disposaI. 
(i) The high contracting parties undertake not to concIude a separate 
peace with any common enemy. 
(ii) This treaty wil come into force immediately peace has been signed be-
tween Russia and Japan， and wilI remain vaIid untiI one of the par-
ties withdraws from it， a year's notice being necessary. 
(iv) The Emperor of AII the Russias wiIl， as soon as this treaty has come 
into force， take steps to communicate it to France and to persuade 
that country to associate herself with it as a third aly.(19) 
Thus the effect of the treaty was confined to Europe and this treaty was to 
become effective on the very day of the conc1usion of a peace treaty between 
Russia and Japan which was to be negotiated in August and September 1905 at 
Portsmouth in the United States. Even the Kaiser seems to have avoided trying 
to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. In spite of these regulations， the Treaty of 
Bjorko would have been a potential threat to Japan by encouraging Russia to 
continue war with Japan， orat least to take a tougher stand toward Japan. 
This is because the German Kaiser promised his Russian colleague that Ger-
many would ease the situation on the western border of Russia. In that case， 
Russia would be able to concentrate her military efforts on her eastern border. 
The J apanese mi1tary attache in Berlin from 1934， then Colonel， and from 
1938 the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin， Hiroshi Oshima (1886-1975)， gave 
special attention to the potential importance of this treaty to Japan. In his 
lifetime， Oshima repeatedly insisted that the Secret Treaty of Bjorko meant a 
serious menace to Japan by inspiring Russia because she would have been 
released from the German impact on her western border by this treaty. He also 
repeatedly said that his aim in initiating the making of the Anti-Comintern 
Pact between Germany and Japan during his days as military attache in Berlin 
was to avoid the emergence of an analogous situation. He believed that this 
situation could become reality out of a mutual agreement between Hitler's 
Germany and Stalin's Russia. 
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1 will discuss the problem of the Anti-Comintern Pact later. Here， 1 would 
simply like to point out that， apart from the historical details surrounding the 
Treaty of Bjorko， we may perceive from it a certain kind of geographical 
dynamics constantly at work throughout the Eurasian Continent. This is to say 
that Russia may be forced to choose to establish a status of“detente" on her 
western border at a time when her eastern border is threatened. The reverse 
would also be true. 
The Treaty of Bjorko a1so embraced the Kaiser's ulterior aim of rea1izing 
his dream of a “Continenta1 League"， as was once pointed out by the 
American historian Sidney B. Fay.(20) Aleksander Izvolsky， once an important 
Foreign Minister of the Tzarist Russia， writing in 1919， also confirmed that 
this treaty aimed at a continental coalition. He wrote in“Revue des Deux 
Mondes": 
“The treaty of Bjorko was not an act of disloyalty to France. It was quite 
c1early aimed at Great Britain， Russia's hereditary enemy， with whom she 
was constantly coming into conftict， both in Europe and Asia. . . Asthe in-
ftuence of Great Britain was everywhere felt， and always to Russia's detri-
ment， was it not natural and even justifiable on the part of the Emperor 
Nicholas to seek guarantees against Britain in the shape of a continental 
coalition?' '(21) 
We will see that such idea of a continental league or coalition throughout 
the Eurasian Continent aiming at Great Britain or the United States， or at 
both， repeatedly emerged on the German as well as the Japanese side. The idea 
of a Russo・German“detente"and the idea of a continenta1 bloc were both 
contained in an embryonic form within the Treaty of Bjorko. These two pro・
totypes of ideas would be developed later by the German and the Japanese 
diplomats. This is the reason why 1 have given so much attention to the almost 
forgotten episode of the diplomatic history. 
II. Russo-German Relations during World War 1 inthe Percep-
tions 01 the Japanese Foreign Minister Kikujiro Ishii 
The example of the Secret Treaty of Bjorko may suggest that Russia as a 
menace to Japan is strengthened if Germany tries to support Russia. Needless 
to say， that Germany is thereby pursuing her own aims within the scope of 
European politics. German diplomacy seems to have never studied sufficient1y， 
even until to-day， the meaning of East Asia for Germany herself. German 
diplomacy is directed or confined to the European theatre. Without Germany's 
intending it， a German policy of establishing a status of “detente" between 
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Germany and Russia can， under certain circumstances， strengthen Russia's 
position toward East Asia. 
What worried the Japanese po1icy decision makers during Wor1d War 1 was 
the emergence of a similar situation， but this time by the surrender of Russia to 
Germany. What worried them was whether Russia would be able to resist Ger-
many until the end of the war. Were Russia to surrender to Germany， J apan 
would have been exposed to direct German impact. 
Kikujiro Ishii (1866-1945)， Ambassador in Paris at the outbreak of Wor1d 
War 1 and from October 1915 to October 1916 Foreign Minister of the Second 
Okuma Cabinet， wrote of his apprehension about the possibility of a separate 
peace between Russia and Germany such as the precedent of the year 1762 dur-
ing the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) and of a coming Continental bloc com-
bining Russia and Germany in his memoirs as follows: 
“. • .If any of the Allied powers were to make peace with the enemy， the 
resulting embarrassment and danger to the remaining Allies， including 
Japan， would be incalculable. From the very beginning the author (Ishi) 
had had the feeling that if there was one among the Allied nations which 
could not be trusted to remain steadfast to the end it was Russia. Each time 
he read the story of the Seven Years' War in the diplomatic history of 
Europe a certrain uneasiness would seize him. It may have been a presenti-
ment. The author who believes in the axiom that history repeats itself， 
could not assure himself that Russia would in the present war fight to the 
last， not repeating the example of the Seven Years' War. . . History shows 
that separate peace has usually been a prelude to an alliance. Now suppos-
ing that Russia had first made peace and then an alliance with Germany， 
what would Japan's position have been? Foreigners have criticized Japan 
on the ground that although she was one of the belligerents she ran one of 
the risks of war， but on the contrary reaped the rich harvest of neutrality. 
In the event， however， that Russia and Germany had concluded between 
themselves first a separate peace and later an alliance， J apan might have 
been compelled to fight alone the Russian and German armies in the Far 
East. 
In the meantime， the war was developing more and more unfavorably 
for Russia. One cabinet followed another in quick succession and finally in 
the autumn of 1915 the rumor was heard that an unusually pro-German 
government， headed by Stuermer， would come into power. Stories went 
about that Germany had shipped parts of submarines over the Siberian 
Railway to Uladivostok and would there assemble them for active use on 
the China coast and in the Indian Ocean， with Canton as their base.' '(2) 
It was at this time that Ishii became Japan's Foreign Minister. He says in his 
memoirs that he took the following two measures concerning Russia. First， 
Japan replenished Russia's shortage of arms to the limit of her capacity.(23) Sec-
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ond， Japan conc1uded the Fourth Agreement with Russia on July 3， 1916.(24) 
According to Ishi， the intention on the Japanese side consisted in“relieving 
Russia of any anxiety she may have felt in respect to her Eastern territory and 
binding both parties not to make any arrangement with a third party directed 
against their respective interests."(2S) 
Foreign Minister Ishi's fear of the possibility of a Russo・Germanalliance 
was similar to Colonel Oshima's interpretation of the Secret Treaty of Bjorko 
which motivated his initiative in binding ties between Oermany and Japan in 
the form of the Anti-Comintern Pact. 
IV. Shinpei Goto's Conclψtion 01 a Continental Bloc 
throughout the Eurasian Continent 
A different way of thinking about the Russo・Germanrelations-
diametrically opposed to the idea of preventing the rapprochement between 
the two countriesー isto welcome from the J apanese side this rapprochement 
and to encourage it. This idea was fostered and propagated by a J apanese 
politician Count Shinpei Ooto (1857-1929)， who once acted as administrator 
of civil affairs in Taiwan. He was then appointed to Director ofthe South Man-
churian Railway and later succeeded Ichiro Motono， Ishi's successor， as
Foreign Minister. 
Ootδoccupies a unique position in the history of Japanese politics. He 
started his life as a physician and studied in Germany from 1890 to 1893. He 
received the title of medica1 doctor there and was appointed administrator of 
civil affairs in Taiwan in 1898. When he served in Taiwan， heread the book of 
Oerman author， Emil Schalk， Der Wettkampf der Volker (The Struggle of Na-
tions)，(26) 1905， and was greatly inftuenced by it. Schalk (1834-1904) insists that 
Germany and France must co-operate so that Europe can confront the impact 
from the United States. Born in Mainz in Germany， and having studied in 
France， he went to the United States and seems to have felt the tremendous 
potential energy of this country which was not properly assessed in his days in 
Europe. (27) If Germany and France continue to oppose each other， these two 
countries and Europe at large would necessarily be overwhelmed by the United 
States， heargues.(28) Starting from Scha1k's remarks Ooto developed a theory 
of confrontation of the two Continents， 01d and New， and when he was ap-
pointed Director of the South Manchurian Railway in 1906， he began to pro・
mote this theory which was based upon the ideas of Schalk. (29) His description 
of how he preached this idea to Prince Hirobumi Ito on the occasion of their 
talks in the year 1907 in Itsukushima near Hiroshima belongs to one of the 
most impressive passages in his memoirs “Itsukushima yawa" (Night Ta1ks in 
-9ー
Itsukushima).(30) According to these memoirs， Goto persuaded Ito to consult 
the Russian Minister of Finance， Kokovtseff， inHarbin about Goto's ideas. 
On October 26， shortly after talking with Kokovtseff， Ito was assassinated at 
the Harbin station.(31) 
Goto's interest focused not on Germany， but on Russia. He aimed at pro-
moting friendly relations between Russia and J apan by furthering the Russo-
Japanese Entente which existed since 1907. By the outbreak of the Russian 
Revolution in November 1917， the Tsarist Russia as partner of the Entente 
disappeared. Even after that， Goto continued to pursue his aim of Russo-
Japanese alignment and in 1923， when he was mayor of the City of Tokyo， 
overcoming great difficulties invited the Soviet diplomat Adolf J 0宜'efrom the 
Soviet Union. In the winter 1927128， Goto visited Moscow and talked with 
Stalin， Chicherin and Karakhan on the subject of the Soviet-Japanese rela-
tions. It was his second and last visit to Russia. 
Goto's view of Russo-Japanese alignment was based on the idea of a Eura-
sian Continental bloc， but it remained outside the mainstream of J apanese 
diplomacy. The so-called orthodox Kasumigaseki diplomacy represented by 
Count Takaaki Kato and Baron KijurδShidehara as its champions， right from 
the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 until the outbreak of the 
Manchurian Incident in 1931， consisted in pursuing an understanding with 
Great Britain and the United States. The idea of a Eurasian Continental bloc 
was revived by the Japanese Foreign Minister Yδsuke Matsuoka (1880-1946) 
in 1940. It would seem that Matsuoka was infiuenced by Goto. Matsuoka serv-
ed in the Kwantung Leased Territory in the Liaotung Peninsula when Gotδ 
acted as Director of South Manchurian Railway， which had its main office 
there. Matsuoka also served the Foreign Minister Goto as his secretary. Like 
Goto， Matsuoka later acted as Director of the South Manchurian Railway 
from 1935 to 1939. Also like Goto， Matsuoka remained heretical with regard 
to the orthodox Japanese diplomacy，<32) 
V. Anti-Comintern Pact and Tripartite Alliance 
As was suggested above， the Japanese military attache in Berlin， Hiroshi 
Oshima， tried to establish an understanding between Hitler's Germany and 
Japan. To avoid the emergence of a Eurasian Continental bloc against Japan 
by an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union was the aim Oshima 
pursued in establishing the Anti-Comintern ties between Germany and Japan. 
(3) The text of the Artic1e 1 of the secret supplementary protocol which was at-
tached to the 0血cialdocument of the Anti-Comintern Pact and which was 
based on the initiative of Colonel Oshima， provided as follows: 
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“Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of an un-
provoked attack or threat of attack by the USSR， the other High Contrac-
ting Party obligates itself to take no measure that would tend to ease 
(entlasten) the situation of the USSR. "(34) 
The idea which motivated Japan to the conc1usion of the Tripartite 
Alliance Berlin-Rome-Tokyo on September 27， 1940， was quite contraryto the 
idea of Oshima and the secret supplementary protocol which is quoted above. 
In spite of the existence of the Anti-Comintern Pact including this protocol 
and without consulting even Oshima， who had since been promoted to the 
Japanese Ambassador in Berlin， the German Foreign Minister Joachim von 
Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on August 23， 
1939， inMoscow. At about the same time， the Kwantung Army of Japan was 
experiencing total defeat before the overwhelming strength of the Red Army of 
the Soviet Union in a loca1 war in Nomonhan near the Manchurian and the 
Mongolian borders.(35) These double shock forced even the most diehard町my
leaders of Japan to revise their attitude toward the Soviet Union. Unfortunate-
ly the impact of the defeat in Nomonhan on the Japanese army leaders has 
been lit1e studied as yet. So we know litle about how this impact infl.uenced 
on the political and strategical decision making of these leaders. Nevertheless， 
it would be possible to assume that these two shocks were almost equally great 
to these leaders who played the decisive role in the policy decision making pro-
cess of those days when the military intervention into poIitics was approaching 
its zenith. (35) 
Hitler's military offensive on the Western front in April1940 put an end to 
the phase of “phony war". His phenomenal victory over Denmark， Norway， 
Belgium， Holland and France astonished and galvanized the Japanese， 
especially the army leaders. The second Konoe Cabinet， taking office in July 
1940， had to face renewed demands from the army for an arrangement with 
the triumphant Germany. (37) Prince Konoe chose Matsuoka as Foreign 
Minister. Matsuoka was inspired by the idea of a quadruple entente between 
Rome， Berlin， Moscow and Tokyo. This idea corresponded to the wish not 
only of the J apanese army， but副soof the J apanese navy. (38) Without going 
into any detail， 1 would only like to point out that Matsuoka's idea correspond-
ed to the idea of a Continenta1 bloc cherished by the German Foreign Minister 
von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop was dreaming of a Continental bloc “from 
Gibraltar to Yokohama."(39) In their secret talks of September 9 and 10，1940， 
Heinrich Stahmer， Ribbentrop's special envoy to Tokyo， conveyed to Mat-
suoka the following of Ribbentrop' 
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“Better to reach agreement between Germany， Italy， and Japan first and 
then immediately to approach Soviet Russia. Germany is prepared to act 
part of an honest broker on the questions of rapprochement between 
Japan and Soviet Russia， and she can see no unsurmountable obstacle 
on the path， may be settled without much di血culty.German-Soviet 
relations are good， contrary to what the British propaganda tries to 
represent， and Russia is carrying out to the satisfaction of Germany al her 
engagements. "(40) 
This message by Stahmer which carried the personal authority of Ribben-
trop(41) seems to have influenced Matsuoka decisively. The existence of the Oer-
man回SovietNon-Aggression Pact appears to have offered Matsuoka a basis for 
such an idea. Japanese diplomacy was deeply struck by this Pact， which， until 
the very day of its conclusion， seemed impossible to the Japanese policy deci-
sion-makers. 
Matsuoka， irritated by the fact that Germany showed no zeal in fulfilling 
her promise of playing part of an honest broker in mediating to ameliorate the 
relations between Moscow and Tokyo， visited Oermany， Italy and the Soviet 
Union in the spring of the year 1941. Through the direct talks with Stalin， he 
was able to succeed in signing the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the 
Soviet Union on April13， 1941. His dream of a quadruple entente throughout 
the Eurasian Continent seemed to have become reality. This dream was short-
lived， however. On June 22， 1941， HitIer began his military offensive upon the 
Soviet Union. This did huge damage to Matsuoka's reputation. He was forced 
to resign in July.(42) 
There are some similarities between the idea of Matsuoka and that of Ootδ. 
It is difficult to assess exactly as to what extent Matsuoka was influenced by 
Goto's idea of the confrontation of the Old and the New Continents. Both in・
tended to play so to say a Russian card. The idea of a quadruple entente on 
Matsuoka's side and of a Continental bloc “from Gibraltar to Y okohama" on 
Ribbentrop's side were both destroyed completely by Hitler's order to attack 
the Soviet Union in June 1941. Matsuoka's dream of strengthening Japan's 
position toward the United States of the New Continent by realizing a Eura-
sian Continentalleague consisting of Italy， Oermany， the Soviet Union and 
Japan， and of solving the Sino-Japanese War through the mediation of the 
United States， failed totally on the day when the German army began to attack 
the Soviet border. Matsuoka dreamed that the Americans would soften their at-
titude toward J apan when they were faced with a strong Continental league 
and would accept the role of a peacekeeper between China and Japan， just as 
once the American President Theodore Rooseve1t had done in the Russo-
Japanese War. 
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VI. The Chen-pao-tao lncident and the Dynamics working 
throughout the Eurasian Continent 
About a quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War， 
shooting between the People's Liberation Army of Mainland China and the Ar-
my of the Soviet Union once more reminded us of the dynamics at work 
throughout the Eurasian Continent. On March 2， 1969， an exchange of fire 
took place on the Chen-pao・taoor in Russian Damansky island in the Ussuri 
River. Shortly before the outbreak of this incident on the eastern border of the 
Soviet Union， the Soviet authorities had been increasing their bitter verbal at-
tacks on West Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany had at that time 
been preparing for the Federal meeting to be held in the building of the former 
German Parliament (Reichstag) standing by the Spree River. The President of 
the Federal Republic was to be elected at this meeting in West Berlin. The 
Soviet authorities had been expressing their dissatisfaction by violent protests 
and military gestures. According to their understanding， West-Berlin was not 
an integral part of the German Federal Republic. This meeting was interpreted 
by them as a challenging act of the West Germans to the Soviet Union. On 
March 2， the Russians went so far as to declare that they would not guarantee 
the safety of the aeroplanes carrying the deputies of the Federal Meeting from 
West Germany to West-Berlin. Nothing of great importance occurred on March 
2， however， and the election of the Federal President was held on March 5 
without any obstruction on the part of the Soviet Union. Gustav Heinemann 
was elected as President. (43) What factor caused this sudden change in the at・
titude of the Soviet Union? 
This change of the Russian attitude toward West Germany took place on 
the very day that a local Russo・Chinesewar took place on the U ssuri River. We 
are reminded here of the lessons of the Treaty of Bjorko of 1905. It is possible 
to assume， ifwe listen carefully to the lessons of history， that the Soviet 
Union， frightened by the outbreak of a military incident with People's China， 
intended to pursue a “detente" with her western neighbour， namely the Ger-
man Federal Republic. General Lin-piao of the People's Liberation Army 
played the part of Admiral Togo who destroyed the Russian Fleet at the battle 
of Tsushima. Needless to say， General Lin-piao was not 50 successful as Ad-
miral Togo. The Cherトpao-taoIncident has probably something to do with hi5 
downfall in 1971. 
Klau5 Mehnert， a prominent West欄GermanChina-watc 
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If we accept his assumption， we can further assume that the background and 
premise of the success of the Eastern policy (Ostpolitik) of the West German 
. Chancellor Wi1ly Brandt was at least partly prepared by the outbreak of the 
Chen-pao・taoIncident. 
Another researcher of international relations， Andrew J. Pierre， has analyz-
ed the Soviet motives in signing the Bonn-Moscow Treaty， which is sometimes 
called the Second Russo・GermanNon-Aggression Pact， with West Germany 
on August 10， 1970， asfollows: 
“Considerations of a strategic and political nature paral1el economic incen-
tives for a new relationship with West Germany， and may wel1 be the 
primary ones. As almost every visitor to Moscow in the past years attests， 
there is a deep concern over relations with China and the situation on the 
Far Eastern border. The small scale fighting on the Ussuri led to a buildup 
of the already large forces on the border. . "“0) 
West Germany is almost completely integrated into Western Europe to・
day. This Western integration was promoted under the leadership of Federal 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer during his long reign from 1949 to 1963. Ignor-
ing the protests of the German Social Democrats under the leadership of Kurt 
Schumacher(47) and of men like the later President Gustav Heinemann， (48)
Adenauer pursued the course of West orientation without any hesitation. For 
his successors including the Social Democrat Willy Brandt， there remained lit-
tle room to revise this course fundamentally. Brandt was neither Bismarck nor 
William the Second， though some West Germans in enthusiasm believed 
Brandt to be a second Bismarck， when Brandt begaIl to realize his Eastern 
policy. Bismarck could manipulate Russia skillfully with his diplomatic talent. 
William the Second offered a state of “detente" to Russia when Russia was seri-
ously threatened by war with Japan. Brandt possessed no such freedom of 
choice as had， orwere believed to have had， Bismarck or William the Second. 
But it is also difficult to assume that Brandt could have attained his success of 
realizing the Bonn-Moscow Treaty had there not been any sign of serious 
military confrontation between Moscow and Peking. Russia was troubled in 
1969 not by Japan， but her Communist neighbour， the People's Republic of 
China. The geographical fact that on her western border， though no more di-
rectly， Russia neighbours Germany and on her eastern border China， and indi-
rectly Japan， remains unchanged. Russia must avoid， asfar as possible， having 
serious troubles on both borders at the same time. There is no doubt that in 
1969 People's China became a very real enemy to Russia. West Germany re-
mains， atleast on the psychologicallevel， Russia's potential enemy， an enemy 
which might become far more troublesome to Russia than Mainland China. 
West Germany stil occupies a pivotal strategic position in world politics. So it 
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would be important and necessary for us historians to keep in mind the Euro-
pean theatre and the East Asian theatre at the same time. The same proposi-
tion would have validity， mutatis mutandis， asregards the Atlantic theatre and 
the Pacifi.c theatre of the history of the United States. 
The British newspaper“The Independent" of February 10， 1987， conveys 
a report from Moscow of the Reuter correspondent Timothy Heritage with the 
title “Sino・Soviettalks begin". We can see there that the problem of Chen-
pao・taoor Chenbao island， asis written by this correspondent， will be dis-
cussed again after nine years between Moscow and Peking. The Reuter cor-
respondent reports as follows: 
“The Soviet Union and China resumed border talks yesterday (February 9) 
for the first time in nearly nine years after signs of concessions from 
Moscow over the demarcation of their frontier along two rivers in the Far 
East. 
Asian sources said Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev and 
Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen would review their countries' 
positions， but big breakthroughs were unlikely. 
The talks， which focus on where the border lies in the Amur and Ussuri 
rivers， broke down in 1978. Their resumption follows a gradual increase in 
Sino欄Sovietcontacts in economic， cultural and sCIentific spheres. . . 
Frontier talks began in October 1969 and continued intermittently until 
June 1978， when they became a casualty of foreign policy and ideological 
disputes between the two countries. . . 
China says the present borders were fixed unfairly under treaties agreed 
in pre-communist times， and once accused Soviet leaders of behaving 
worse than the tsars on the issue. 
But Deputy Foreign Minister Makhail Kapitsa said in August that 
島10scowwas ready to consider Peking's position and recognize that the 
border passed along the main channel of the Amur and Ussuri rivers， 
rather than on the Chinese side. 
Mr Kapitsa， an Asian specialist， was speaking a week after Mr Gor-
bachev offered concessions on the Amur river in a speech in Vladivostok. 
Asian diplomats said Mr Kapitsa's remarks indicated Moscow might ac-
cept de facto Chinese control over Chenbao island (Damansky island)， 
which lies on the Chinese aide of the Ussuri， and is at the heart of the 
dispute. . .' '(49) 
This report shows that Chen-pao・taoremains a troublesome issue between 
the Russians and the Chinese. To establish a state of “detente" among them， 
this issue must be dissolved among other issues. 
The future of the Sino-Soviet relations is a matter of great concern， not 
only for the West Germans， but also for the Americans. Or， it would be more 
accurate to say， the Americans are mostly concerned about its future. If a state 
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of real “detente" were to be established betweens the Russians and the 
Chinese， the Russians might be able to take an essentially firmer attitude than 
to-day toward the Americans. 
Nevertheless， the geographical dynamics inherent in the nature of the Eura-
sian Continent would not cease to work even in the age of the long-range 
missiles. And we would also be able to say， that some propositions contained 
in the lecture of Sir Halford John Mackinder are totally outdated especially by 
the development of aviation as the means of civil and military transportation， 
but that some propositions are stiI1 valid. It is interesting to imagine what 
Mackinder who was born in 1861 and died in 1947 at the age of eighty-six 
would have said if he could have observed the development of the world 
politics up to the present day. (50) 
NOTES 
(1) Halford John Mackinder， The Scope and Methods 01 Geography; and The 
Geographical Pivot 01 History: reprinted with an Introduction by E. W. Gil・
bert (London: The Royal Geographical Society， 1951)， p.31. 
(2) Introduction， ibid.， pp. 3-4. Yasunobu Somura， Chiseigaku nyamon. Gaikδ 
senryaku no seijigaku (Introduction to Geopolitics. Politics of Diplomatic 
Strategy) (Tokyo: Chuo北oron-sha，1984) (Japanese Text) discusses in detai1life 
and works of Mackinder. 
(3) Mackinder， op. cit.， p.40. 
(4) Ibid.， p.43. 
(5) Ibid.， p.44. 
(6) GordonA. Craig， Germany 1866-1945 (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress， 1978)， 
p. 13lf.， p.237. 
(7) David Calleo， The German Problem Reconsidered. Germany and the World 
Orde.九 1870to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press， 1978)， p.
(8) D. C. B. Lieven， Russia and the Origins 01 the First World War (London and 
Basingstoke: The Macmi1an Press， 1983)， p.24f. 
(9) Ibid.， p.28. Ian H. Nish is of the opinion that Japan was not incited by Britain 
to war with Russia. See Nish， The Anglo・JapaneseAlliance. The Diplomaの，01 
Two Island Empires 1894-1907 (London: The Athlone Press， 1966)， p.282. 
(10) Lieven， op. cit.， p.28. On the making of the Entente Cordiale between London 
and Paris， se Nish， op. cit.， p.286f. 
(11) Lieven， op， cit.， p.28. 
(12) John A. White， The D伊lomaり 01the Russo・JapaneseWar (Princeton， New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press， 1964)， p.214. 
(13) Lieven， op. cit.， p.28. 
(14) Sidney B. Fay， The Origins 0/ the World War， 2.revised ed. (New York: The 
Macmi1an Company， 1930)， p.174. 
-16ー
(15) Ibid. 
(16) Ibid.， p.174f. 
(17) Ibid.， p.175. 
(18) Lieven， op. cit.， p.28. Cf. White， op. cit.， p.215. 
(19) Georges Michon， The Franco-Russian Alliance， Translated by Norman Thomas 
(London: George Allen & Unwin， 1929)， p.143f. The original text of the treaty 
is in Die grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette， XIX (2) (Berlin， 1925)， p.
465. 
(20) Fay， op. cit.， p.170f. 
(21) “Revue des Deux Mondes"， Nov. 1， 1919; Cited by Michon， op. cit. p. 144f. 
(22) Viscount Kikuriro Ishi， Diplomatic Commentaries， Translated and edited by 
William R. Langdon (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press， 1936)， p.105. This 
is the translation of Ishi's own memoirs Gaiko yoroku (Tokyo: Iwanami-
shoten， 1930) by the American consul Langdon. The translation is based on the 
third and revised edition published in 1931 and covers about the half of the 
original Japanese edition. The quotation here is added the necessary revision. 
The English version:“It may have been a presentiment， but in spite of his belief 
in the axiom that history repeats itself， he could not assure himself that Russia 
would in the present war repeat her tenacity ofthe Seven Years' War and fight to 
the last!" is not quite correct. 
(23) Ibid.， p.106. 
(24) Ibid. On Japan's four agreements with Russia， see Ernest B. Price， The Russo-
Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 concerning Manchuria and Mongolia 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press， 1933)， chap. II.， and Naokichi Tanaka， 
“Nisso kyosho ron" (On the Russo-Japanese Entente)， inKamikawa sensei 
kanreki kinen: Kindai Nihon gaikδshi no kenkyu (Studies of the diplomatic 
history of modern Japan: In celebrating the sixtieth birthday of Professor 
Kamikawa)， edited by Toshio Ueda et al. (Tokyo: Y包hi・kaku，1956). 
(25) Ishi， ibid. Ishii's interpretation cited here about the Fourth Russo-Japanese 
Agreement was not totally identical with the idea of the initiator of this agree-
ment， Prince Aritomo Yamagata， the most inftuential genr，δ(elder statesman) of 
that time. Yamagata pursued to conclude this treaty energetically not only with 
the aim to deter the making of a Russo・Germanalliance， but also with the aim to 
secure a “white" ally in a coming racial struggle which was unavoidable in his 
conviction. Cf. Roger F， Hackett， Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern 
Japan， 1838-1922 (Cambridge， Massachusetts: Harvard University Press， 1971)， 
p.299. 
(26) Emil Schalk， Der Wettkampf der Volker mit besonderer Be 
-17-
(29) Ibid.， p.964f. 
(30) Cited in ibid.， pp. 964-970. 
(31) Cf. Price， op. cit.， p， 51. 
(32) Japanese historian， Michio Fujimura， insists that“Japan's Asian policy was 
split into the ideologies of Yellow Imperialism and White Imperialism，" And he 
explains as follows:“Yellow Imperialism was based on the concept of a global 
confrontation between the yellow and white races and sought to oppose the 
West through a league of Asian countries led by Japan. White Imperialism was 
based on the idea of a world divided into civilization and barbarism in which 
Japan identified itself with the West and sought to dominate Asia by imitating 
and cooperating with the West in its encroachment in Asia. Yellow Imperialism 
originated in the idea of a Sino・Japanese alliance and was related to the concept 
of Pan-Asianism. White Imperialism was based on the idea of Japan's 
'withdrawal from Asia' and was connected with the arguments for the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance which came from the Foreign Ministry's mainstream fac-
tion." Fujimura，“Japan's Changing View of Asia" in Japan Quarterly， Vol. 
XXIV， No. 4， October-December 1977 (published by the Asahi Newspaper Co.， 
Tokyo)， p.431. According to this dichotomy， both Yamagata and Goto would 
be classified as the followers of Yellow Imperialism， which was not the Foreign 
Ministry's mainstream faction. 
(3) According to the interpretation of Ribbentrop's foreign policy by a German 
historian， Wolfgang Michalka， Ribbentrop perceived the Anti-Comintern Pact 
as “pro forma zwar ideologisch・antibolschewistisch，de facto aber 
machtpolitisch-antibritish" (although pro forma ideologically and in an anti-
Bolshevist way， but de facto from the view of power politics and in an anti-
British way): Wolfgang Michalka， Ribbentrop und die deutsche Wel伊olitik
1933-1940. Aussenpolitische Konz，伊 tionenund Entscheidungsprozesse im Drit-
ten Reich (Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag， 1980)， p.119. If this interpretation 
of Michalka's scholarly work on Ribbentrop is correct， Oshima's perception of 
the Anti-Comintern Pact was totally different from that of Ribbentrop with 
whom Oshima negotiated. On Oshima' life and political activity， cf.Carl Boyd， 
The Extraordinary Envoy: General Hiroshi Oshima and Diplomacy in the Third 
Reich. 1934-1939 (Washington: University Press of America， 1980). Cf. Alfred 
Vagts， The Military Attache (Princeton， New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press， 1 
- 18ー
on the Tripartite A1liance Berlin-Rome-Tokyo) (Tokyo: Nanso-sha， 1975) 
(Japanese Text with English summary). The bibliography on these subjects is 
contained in it. Cf. Gerhard Krebs， Japans Deutschlandpolitik 1935-1941: Eine 
Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Pazifischen Krieges， MOAG Mitteilungen der 
GeseUschaft fur Natur-und Volkerkunde Ostasiens e. V.， Bd. 91， 2 vols (Ham崎
burg， 1984). 
(39) On Ribbentrop's idea of a Continental bloc “from Gibraltar to Yokohama，" 
see Michalka， op. cit.， p.255. 
(40) “Some of the Salient Points in the Informal Conversations between Matsuoka 
and Stahmer， with the German Ambassador Assisting" (International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East， Exhibit， No. 549) (Italic by Miyake). The English text 
is shown in: Miyake， op. cit.， p.462. 
(41) Ibid.， p.463. 
(42) On the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact， cf. George A. Lensen， The Strange 
Neutrality. Soviet-Japanese Relations during the Second World War 1941-1945 
(Tallahassee， Florida: The Diplomatic Press， 1972). 
(43) K1aus Mehnert，“Der Moskauer Vertrag，" in Osteuropa. Zeitschrift fur Gegen-
wartsfragen des Ostens， 20 Jg.， H. 12， Dezember 1970， p.812. Cf. Mehnert， 
“Die Schusse am Ussuri und ihr Echo， Dokumente，" in Osteuropa， 19. Jg.， H， 
8， August 1969. 
(44) Mehnert，“Der Moskauer Vertrag，" p. 814. 
(45) Ibid. 
(46) Andrew J. Pierre，“The Bonn-Moscow Treaty of 1970: Milestone or Mirage?" 
in The Russian Review. An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia Past and Pre-
sent， Vol. 3D， No. 1， January 1971， p.20f. Cf. Masaki Miyake， Die deutsche 
Nachkriegsentwicklung aus japanischer Sicht: Versuch einer vergleichenden 
Beobachtung (Occasional Papers: Social and Economic Research on Modern 
Japan， No. 50， edited by the East Asian Institute， Free University Berlin， West-
Berlin: Verlag Ute Schiller， 1985)， pp. 26-28. 
(47) Cf. Lewis J. Edinger， Kurt Schumacher. A Study in Personality and Political 
Behavior (Stanford， California: Stanford University Press， and London: Ox-
ford University Press， 1965). 
(48) Ernst Nolte， Deutschland und der kalte Krieg， 2.neu bearbeitete Aufl.age (Stut-
tgart: Klet剛Kotta，1985)， p.253f. and passim. 
(49) On the nature of the border disputes on Hei Hsia-tzu or “Bear Island" lying on 
the confl.uence of the Amur River and the Ussuri River， see Neville Maxwell， 
Why The Russians Lifted the Block，αde at Bear Island， Reprint Series No. 104， 
Oxford University， Institute of Commonwealt 
-19-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This article was written during my research stay in the years 1986/87 in Lon-
don and was read at the Seminar at the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies， 
Oxford (13 March 1987). It was read in an abridged form at the annua1 
meeting of the British Association for Japanese Studies (BAJS)， held at Cam-
bridge University (25 March 1987). As a basis for this訂ticle1 used my short 
oral presentation at the First Tamkang European Conference， 7-9 September 
1984 (Area Studies， Special Issue September， 1984， Proceedings: The First 
Tamkang European Studies Conference， East and West Europe， Integrating 
and Disintegrating Forces， Published by Tamkang University， Taipei). This 
short essay was totally revised and much enlarged in London. This article was 
also read， again in an abridged form in my oral presentation at the Interna-
tiona1 Round-Table Discussion in Moscow on “20th Century: Main Problems 
and Tendencies of Internationa1 Relations" ， organized by the Institute of 
Genera1 History of the USSR Academy of Sciences (20】 26November 1989). 
1 wou1d like to express my hearty gratitude to a11 those who enabled me to 
write and orally to present for discussion the article published here， toPro-
fessor Stephan Hsu of Tamkang University (now in the Free China Informル
tion Office in Kopenhagen)， toProfessor J. A. A. Stockwin of Oxford Univer-
sity， toDr. Bryan Bridges of the Royal Institute of International Affairs， 
London (at that time)， Professor A. O. Chubarain， director of the Institute of 
Genera1 History of the USSR Academy of Sciences， Moscow， and last but not 
least， toMeiji University， which financed my research stay at the German 
Historica1 Institute in London. 
The situation in Russia has now totally changed， and Russo・Germanrelations 
changed as well. Russo・Chineserelations have also been changed dramatically， 
especially by Gorbachev's visit to Peking and the normalization of relations 
between Moscow and Peking in May 1989. It is now necessary to re-examine 
fundamenta11y the problems dea1t with in this artic1e from to・day'spoint of 
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